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Political institutions can affect corruption. We use audit reports from an anti-corruption program in
Brazil to construct new measures of political corruption in local governments and test whether electoral
accountability affects the corruption practices of incumbent politicians. We find significantly less corruption
in municipalities where mayors can get reelected. Mayors with re-election incentives misappropriate
27 percent fewer resources than mayors without re-election incentives. These effects are more pronounced
among municipalities with less access to information and where the likelihood of judicial punishment
is lower. Overall our findings suggest that electoral rules that enhance political accountability play
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The abuse of entrusted power by politicians through rent-seeking and corruption is a threat
to many modern democracies. Developing countries, in particular, provide seemingly endless
examples of political elites diverting funds intended for basic public services such as health,
schools, and roads for private gains.1 While the pervasive eﬀects of corruption on economic
development have been well documented, the root causes are poorly understood.2
Variation in electoral systems is believed to explain a signiﬁcant portion of the diﬀerences
in corruption practices across countries. Because voters can oust corrupt politicians from oﬃce,
electoral rules that enhance political accountability should constrain the behavior of corrupt
politicians.3 However, while there are convincing theoretical arguments for why political insti-
tutions aﬀect corruption (see for example Myerson (1993) and Persson, Roland, and Tabellini
(1997)), the empirical evidence identifying the speciﬁc electoral structures that discipline politi-
cians’ behavior suﬀers from at least two important shortcomings. First, most of these studies are
based on indices that measure perceptions rather than actual political corruption. Second, many
have relied primarily on cross-country analysis, where the inability to account for the full set of
institutional arrangements that determine corruption has made results diﬃcult to interpret.
In this paper, we use audit reports from an anti-corruption program in Brazil to construct
new measures of corruption in local governments. We estimate the share of total federal re-
sources transferred to municipalities that is associated with fraud in procurements, diversion of
funds, and over-invoicing for goods and services. By measuring corruption using detailed audit
reports, we are able to separate funds diverted from simple irregularities in bureaucratic proce-
dures. Moreover, local governments in Brazil provide an ideal institutional setting to examine
how local electoral accountability aﬀects corruption. Municipal governments are responsible for
the provision of important public services receiving large sums of resources from the federal
government. Thus, it is not surprising that corruption at the municipal level, as in many other
countries, has become an overarching concern (Rose-Ackerman 1999). Based on our estimates,
corruption is responsible for losses of approximately R$1.5 Billion (US $554 Million) for local
governments.4
With estimates for corruption at the municipal level, we compare mayors serving in a ﬁrst
term to mayors in their second term (who face a term-limit) to identify the eﬀects of re-election
1See for example Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2003), Olken (2007), Reinikka and Svensson (2004)
2See Knack and Keefer (1995), Mauro (1995), Bertrand et al. (2007) for studies examining the impacts of
corruption.
3Adsera, Boix, and Payne (2003), Kunicov´ a and Rose-Ackerman (2005), Lederman, Loayza, and Soares (2005),
Persson, Tabellini, and Trebbi (2003) provide cross-country evidence of the association between electoral rules
and perceptions of corruption.
4We compute this number by using our estimate of misappropriation of 6 percent and applying it to R$24.8
Billion transferred to 5118 municipalities with population less than 450,000 persons in 2002. See Veja (2004) for
examples of widespread local corruption.
1incentives. Our identiﬁcation uses variation only from municipalities audited at the same time
and in the same state, while controlling for a full set of mayor and municipal characteristics.
Also, by estimating the eﬀects of re-election incentives on political corruption at a sub-national
level, we keep constant the macro-level institutions, both formal and informal, whose diﬀerences
plague most cross-country analysis.
Consistent with a simple political agency model, we ﬁnd that mayors with re-election incen-
tives are signiﬁcantly less corrupt than mayors without re-election incentives. In municipalities
where mayors are in their ﬁrst term, the share of resources misappropriated is, on average, 27
percent lower than in municipalities with second-term mayors. The results are robust to not
only various speciﬁcations and estimation strategies, but also to alternative measures of corrup-
tion. Considering that municipalities receive, on average, R$5,459,209 (US$2,017,259) of federal
transfers, lame-duck mayors misappropriate approximately R$148,000 (US$54,688) more than
ﬁrst-term mayors. Assuming that in the absence of re-election incentives, ﬁrst-term mayors
would behave as second-term mayors, re-election incentives are responsible for inducing a reduc-
tion in resources misappropriated in the order of R$433 million (US$160 million). This is almost
half of what the federal government spent on the Bolsa Escola conditional cash transfer program
for all municipalities in Brazil during 2002. We also ﬁnd that the eﬀects of re-election incentives
vary considerably according to diﬀerences in the local institutional settings that govern either
the provision of information or the potential punishment corrupt politicians might suﬀer. For
instance, among municipalities with the presence of local media or local public prosecutors, we
ﬁnd little diﬀerential eﬀect between ﬁrst and second-term mayors. Conversely, for the munic-
ipalities without local media, re-election incentives reduce political corruption by 9 percentage
points. The eﬀects of re-election incentives are also more pronounced in municipalities where
the elections were competitive suggesting that ﬁrst term mayors with an electoral advantage can
aﬀord to be more corrupt.
We also provide several robustness tests that suggest that our ﬁndings are not driven by
unobserved diﬀerences in municipal characteristics, political ability or learning between ﬁrst and
second term mayors. First, using a regression discontinuity analysis, we compare municipalities
where incumbent mayors barely won reelection in 2000 (and thus served as a second-term mayor
from 2001-2004) to municipalities where the incumbent barely lost the election and thus was
replaced by a new mayor (who then served as a ﬁrst term between 2001-2004). This allow us to
control for many unobserved characteristics of the municipality that determine both re-election
and corruption levels. Second, we also compare second-term mayors with the set of ﬁrst-term
mayors who are re-elected in the subsequent election, and are thus potentially as politically able
as second-term mayors. Third, we exploit the fact that some second-term mayors still have career
concerns and seek higher level political oﬃces. Although in their ﬁnal term, these mayors should
behave similarly to mayors who still have re-election incentives. Finally, we compare mayors
2with similar political experience to account for any potential diﬀerences in corruption between
ﬁrst and second-term mayors that might reﬂect learning-by-doing from political oﬃce.
The importance of elections as a disciplining device is well recognized in the literature. This
paper, by using objective measure of corruption and exploiting within country variation in re-
election incentives, overcomes many of the literature’s previous limitations to provide, to the best
of our knowledge, the ﬁrst test of how electoral accountability aﬀects political corruption. More
broadly, our ﬁndings contribute to a growing literature that test the traditional political economy
agency models of Barro (1970), Ferejohn (1986) and Banks and Sundaram (1993).5 These
models predict that incumbent politicians will refrain from maximum rent-extraction in their ﬁrst
electoral term in order to get re-elected and enjoy future rents.6 Our ﬁndings also complement
Ferraz and Finan (2008) who show that voters punish corrupt politicians when information about
corruption practices are publicized. Together, these results suggest that electoral accountability
act as a powerful mechanism to align politicians’ actions with voters’ preferences.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a theoretical framework
that links corruption to re-election incentives. It is within this context that we interpret our
empirical results. Section 3 provides some basic background information on corruption in Brazil,
and section 4 describes the data and how we construct our measures of corruption. Our empirical
strategy is discussed in section 5. The results are presented in section 6, followed by a discussion
of the ﬁndings in section 7. Section 8 concludes the paper.
2 Theoretical Framework
In this section, we present a simple model to help interpret our empirical ﬁndings. We utilize
the political agency framework of Besley (2006), whereby voters decide whether to re-elect an
incumbent, but are unable to observe either his type or actions.7 In a world of corrupt and
non-corrupt politicians, a corrupt mayor who faces the possibility of re-election can exploit
this information asymmetry to increase re-election chances by refraining from rent-seeking and
behaving as a non-corrupt mayor. Given these re-election incentives, the model predicts that
mayors who face re-election incentives will on average be less corrupt than mayors who do not.8
5Besley and Case (1995) show that re-election incentives aﬀect the ﬁscal policy of U.S. governors, and List and
Sturm (2006) provide evidence that term limits even inﬂuence secondary policies, such as environmental policy.
6See Persson and Tabellini (2000) and Besley (2006) for excellent reviews of political agency models.
7Besley (2006) is an adaptation the political agency model of Besley and Smart (2007) and Banks and Sun-
daram (1993), which extended the earlier work of Barro (1970), Ferejohn (1986), Persson, Roland, and Tabellini
(1997).
8Campante, Chor, and Do (2006) presents an alternative model where corruption depends on politician’s
stability. Politicians facing more uncertainty about re-election (a shorter horizon) will extract more rents from
power.
3Basic Model
Consider a two-period model with two types of politicians: a non-corrupt politician nc and
a corrupt politician c. Let π denote the proportion of non-corrupt politicians in the pool of
potential candidates. In each period, the elected politician sets a state-dependent policy et(st,i),
where i ∈ {c,nc} is the type of politician and st ∈ {0,1} is the state of the world at time t. Each
state occurs with equal probability and is only observed by the incumbent politician.
Given the choice of policy, voters receive a payoﬀ of V if et = st and zero otherwise.9 Non-
corrupt politicians set policy to maximize voters’ objectives, whereas corrupt politicians receive
a private beneﬁt rt for setting et 6= st. The private beneﬁt is randomly drawn each period from a
distribution G(r) with mean µ and ﬁnite support [0,R]. The model assumes that R > δ(µ+E)
where δ is a common discount factor less than one and E denotes ego-rents that politicians enjoy
from holding oﬃce.
The timing of this game is as follows. A politician is elected at the beginning of each period,
after which nature reveals to the incumbent the state of the world. If newly elected, nature also
reveals his type. Corrupt incumbents then receive a random draw from the distribution G(r)
of private beneﬁts. After policy is set, voters observe their payoﬀs and then decide whether or
not to re-elect the incumbent or select a challenger who has been drawn at random from the
pool of potential politicians. After elections are held, the corrupt politicians receive another
independent draw r2 from the distribution G(r). Period 2 actions then follow and payoﬀs are
realized.
The perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium of this game requires that each politician behaves
optimally in each period, given the decision rule of the voters. Because the game ends in period
2, absent re-election incentives, each politician sets his preferred policy. Non-corrupt incumbents
will set e2(s,nc) = s2, and corrupt incumbents will set e2(s,c) = 1−s2 to receive r2. Since voters
are better oﬀ with non-corrupt incumbents in period 2, they maximize the likelihood that a non-
corrupt politician is elected to the second period.
The equilibrium in period 1 is much more intriguing. While non-corrupt incumbents will
still behave in accordance with voters’ objectives, corrupt politicians face a tradeoﬀ. A corrupt
politician can extract rents r1 in period 1 and forgo re-election, or alternatively behave as a
non-corrupt politician to guarantee re-election and reap the beneﬁts of a second term.10 Given
this tradeoﬀ, the probability that a corrupt politician provide voters with a positive payoﬀ in
period 1 is simply Pr(r1 ≤ δ(µ + E)): the probability that r1 is less than the present value of
expected future beneﬁts from holding oﬃce in period 2. Based on the distributional assumptions
of r1, this probability, which we denote as λ, is equal to G(δ(µ + E)).
Besley (2006) shows that in equilibrium non-corrupt politicians always set et = st. Corrupt
9The payoﬀs could be related instead to the levels of public good provision.
10Voters observing V will re-elect the incumbent politicians. To see this, note that the probability that a
4politicians choose e2 = (1−s2) in period 2, and e1 = s1 in period 1, provided they earn suﬃciently
small rents. All politicians who choose e1 = s1 will get re-elected. In equilibrium, if the ratio of
disciplined politicians to non-disciplined politicians is larger than the share of non-corrupt types,
i.e. λ
1−λ ≥ π, then rent extraction will on average be higher in the second period than in the
ﬁrst period, that is,11
(1 − π)(1 − λ)
Z R
r1≥δ(µ+E)
rdG(r) ≤ (1 − π)λ
Z R
0




The intuition for this result is simple. When faced with the possibility of re-election, corrupt
politicians have the incentive to reduce rent extraction and provide more public goods. Assuming
the disciplining eﬀect λ is large enough, rents will on average be higher in the second period,
relative to the ﬁrst period. This is the main testable prediction that we take to the data.
3 Institutional Background
Several institutional features of Brazil facilitate the test of whether political incentives aﬀect
corruption levels. First, re-election incentives were introduced in 1997 through a constitutional
amendment that enabled mayors to run for a second consecutive term. This amendment allows
us to compare the corruption levels between municipalities where mayors are in their ﬁrst term
to those where mayors are in their second term. Second, in 2003 the Controladoria Geral da
Uni˜ ao (CGU) introduced an ambitious anti-corruption program that audits municipalities for
their use of federal funds. These audit reports provide objective measures of corruption at the
municipal level.
Moreover, municipal corruption has become an overarching concern for Brazil.12 After the
constitution of 1988, municipal governments became responsible for a substantial share of the
provision of public goods and services, particularly in the areas of education and health. With
the devolution of public service delivery to local governments, the federal government transferred
politician is non-corrupt conditional on observing V is:
Pr(i = NC|V ) =
Pr(V |i = NC)Pr(i = NC)
Pr(V )
=
Pr(V |i = NC)Pr(i = NC)
Pr(i = NC) + Pr(i = C)Pr(r1 ≤ δ(µ + E))
=
π
π + (1 − π)Pr(r1 ≤ δ(µ + E))
≥ π
11The condition that λ
1−λ ≥ π is suﬃcient but not necessary for rents to be higher in the second period. Rents
are higher in the second period if the following inequality holds: π
R R




(λ + (1 − λ)(1 − π))
R r1≤δ(µ+E)
0 rdG(r).
12For a detailed article on municipal corruption see VEJA (2004).
5large amounts of resources to municipalities. Currently, the 5,560 Brazilian municipalities receive
on average $35 billion per year from the federal government, which represents approximately 15
percent of federal government’s revenue.13 This inﬂux of federal funds has substantially increased
the potential for local capture.
3.1 Corruption Schemes in Brazil’s Municipalities
Municipal-level corruption takes on a variety of other forms. Frauds in procurement processes,
diversion of funds, and over-invoicing for goods and services are among the most common ways
local politicians ﬁnd to appropriate resources.14 Other common irregularities include incomplete
public works (paid for but unﬁnished); the use of fake receipts (“notas frias”) and phantom ﬁrms
(a ﬁrm that only exists on paper).
Some examples are useful to illustrate these corruption technologies. A common scheme used
to deviate public resources in the municipalities of El Dorado dos Caraj´ es and Porto Seguro, for
example, include the creation of phantom ﬁrms, simulation of the call for bids, and kickbacks to
government oﬃcials.15 In other contracts, although existing ﬁrms did win the bid, none of them
were even aware that they had participated in the bidding process. The local administration
used the names of these ﬁrms in fake receipts to appropriate resources for public goods that were
never provided.
Another irregular practice, common in several municipalities, is a non-competitive procure-
ment process. While the Brazilian law requires a competitive bidding process with at least three
participants for any project in excess of $30,000 per year, the municipality of Itapetinga in the
state of Bahia, for example, highlights one of the many ways local politicians have manipu-
lated the public procurement process. In 2002 and 2003, the federal government transferred to
Itapetinga $110,000 for the purchase of school lunches. In 12 out of the 16 calls for bids, only
one bid was ever supplied. It was later discovered that each call for bids was posted only one
hour prior to its deadline, and not surprisingly only a ﬁrm owned by the mayor’s brother posted
within the time limit. This same scheme was uncovered for other social programs in the areas
of education and health.
Another common form of corruption is for mayors to divert funds intended for education
and health projects towards the purchase of cars, fuel, apartments, or payment of their friends’
salaries. In some cases, the mayor himself is a direct beneﬁciary. For example, in Paranhos,
Mato Grosso do Sul, $69,838 was paid to implement a rural electriﬁcation project. As it turns
out, one of the farms beneﬁtted by the project was owned by the mayor.
13For comparison, ﬁscal decentralization in the world is on average 6 percent, while in other similar developing
countries it is only 3 percent.
14For a description of municipal corruption schemes in Brazil see Trevisan et al. (2004).
15These descriptions are based on several CGU reports and press releases available at:
www.presidencia.gov.br/cgu.
63.2 Brazil’s Anti-Corruption Program: an Overview
In May 2003 the government of Luiz In´ acio Lula da Silva started an unprecedented anti-
corruption program based on the random auditing of municipal government’s expenditures.
The program, which is implemented through the Controladoria Geral da Uni˜ ao (CGU), aims
to discourage misuse of public funds among public administrators and fostering civil society
participation in the control of public expenditures.
The program started with the audit of 26 randomly selected municipalities, one in each state
of Brazil. It has since expanded to auditing 50 and later 60 municipalities per lottery, from a
sample of all Brazilian municipalities with less than 450,000 inhabitants.16 The lotteries, which
are held on a monthly basis at the Caixa Econˆ omica Federal in Brasilia, are drawn in conjunction
with the national lotteries. To assure a fair and transparent process, representatives of the press,
political parties, and members of the civil society are all invited witness the lottery.
Once a municipality is chosen, the CGU gathers information on all federal funds transfers to
the municipal government from 2001 onwards. Approximately 10 to 15 CGU auditors are then
sent to the municipality to examine accounts and documents, to inspect for the existence and
quality of public work construction, and delivery of public services. Auditors also meet members
of the local community, as well as municipal councils in order to get direct complaints about any
malfeasance.17 After approximately one week of inspections, a detailed report describing all the
irregularities found is submitted to the central CGU oﬃce in Brasilia. The reports are then sent
to the Tribunal de Contas da Uni˜ ao (TCU), to public prosecutors and to the legislative branch
of the municipality. For each municipality audited, a summary of the main ﬁndings is posted
on the internet and disclosed to media sources. It is from these reports that we construct an
objective measure of corruption.
4 Measuring Corruption
In this section, we describe how our measures of corruption are computed and present summary
statistics of the corruption measures and municipal characteristics.
4.1 Measuring Corruption using Audit Reports
As with any illegal activity, obtaining data on corruption is a diﬃcult task. Several empirical
studies that focus on illegal behavior have used indirect evidence to analyze its determinants
and consequences (see for example Duggan and Levitt (2002); Fisman (2002); Fisman and Wei
16This excludes approximately 8 percent of Brazil’s 5500 municipalities, comprising mostly of the state capitals
and coastal cities.
17These auditors are hired based on a public examination, and prior to visiting the municipality receive extensive
training on the speciﬁcities of the sampled municipality. Also, there is a supervisor for each team of auditors.
7(2004), Bandiera, Prat, and Valletti (2007)). However, a small, but growing body of literature
has tried to assess corruption more directly focusing on two forms: bribery of public oﬃcials and
the theft of public resources (Svensson (2003); Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2003); Reinikka and
Svensson (2004); Olken (2007)).
Our approach, although related to the studies cited above, uses a new methodology made
possible by the availability of audit reports from Brazil’s anti-corruption program. Contained in
each report is the total amount of federal funds audited for the current administration, as well
as, an itemized list describing each irregularity and in most cases the amount of funds involved.
Audit reports were available in the beginning of 2004 for the 496 municipalities randomly selected
across the ﬁrst 11 lotteries of the anti-corruption program.18 We read each report classifying
the irregularities found by auditors into corruption indicators and estimate the amount of public
resources misappropriated for each irregularity.
Based on our readings of the reports, we codiﬁed the irregularities listed into several categories
of corruption.19 For the purpose of coding, we deﬁne political corruption to be any irregularity
associated with fraud in procurements, diversion of public funds, and over-invoicing. Speciﬁcally,
we deﬁne a procurement to be irregular if: i) a required procurement was not executed; ii) the
minimum number of bids was not attained; iii) there was evidence of fraud in the procurement
process (e.g. use of bids from non-existing ﬁrms). We categorize diversion of public funds as any
expenditure without proof of purchase or provision and/or direct evidence of diversion provided
by the CGU. Finally, we deﬁne over-invoicing as any evidence that public goods and services
were bought for a value above the market price.
These practices have not only been shown to be the most common ways in which local politi-
cians appropriate resources, but in many instances they are not necessarily mutually exclusive
(see Trevisan et al. (2004)). In eﬀect, over-invoicing and illegal procurement practices often serve
as complementary vehicles for funds diversion. To give a better sense of the irregularities found
and the procedure used to code corruption, we present in the appendix some speciﬁc examples
from the audit reports.
Based on the coding of the reports, we deﬁne as our principal measure of corruption the
total amount of resources related to corrupt activities, expressed as a share of the total amount
of resources audited. While this is our preferred measure, we also report two additional indi-
cators of corruption: the number of irregularities related to corruption and the share of service
items associated with corruption, which simply divides the number of irregularities related to
corruption by the number of service items audited.
18Only 26 municipalities were selected in the ﬁrst lottery. From lottery two to lottery nine, 50 municipalities
were chosen in each. Starting on the tenth lottery in May of 2004, the CGU increased the number of municipalities
sampled to 60.
19We also used two independent research assistants to code the reports in order to provide a check on our
coding.
8There are at least two reasons why we calculate these additional measures. First, although
highly correlated with our main measure, these other indicators help to distinguish whether
second-term mayors also engage in more corrupt transactions. Second, in coding the amount
of resource deviated or involved in an illegal procurement, a dollar amount was not available
in all of the irregularities reported.20 While coding these cases as zero underestimates the
amount of corruption, this could create a bias for testing re-election incentives if the cases
occurred disproportionately for ﬁrst-term mayors.21 By using additional measures we include
these irregularities and thus avoid the potential bias.
4.2 Summary Statistics on Corruption and Government Irregulari-
ties
Summary statistics for each one of the three corruption categories and the overall corruption
indicator are displayed in Table 1. As seen in row 1, 57 percent of the municipalities have
performed an illegal procurement practice, and 54 percent of the municipalities have diverted
some type of funds. Over-invoicing is found much less frequently, occurring in only 7 percent
of our sample. After combining these indicators, we see that 78 percent of the municipalities
have had at least one incidence of corruption. Moreover, those administrations that commit an
act of corruption average around 2.47 corrupt violations, which is 7 percent of the service items
audited. The average amount of resources diverted is R$125,000 (US$46,297) per violation which
represents 8.7 percent of the total amount audited.22
To get a sense for how re-election incentive may aﬀect these various irregularities, Table 2
compares these indicators between municipalities with mayors in their ﬁrst-term to those with
mayors in their second-term. In the ﬁrst set of columns, the share of audited resources found
to be associated with corruption is 1.9 percentage points higher for second-term mayor, and
signiﬁcant at 95 percent level of conﬁdence. Second-term mayors are also more corrupt in each
of the 3 categories of corruption (diversion of funds, illegal procurement practices, and over-
invoicing), but it is the diﬀerence in illegal procurement that accounts for much of the diﬀerence
in the aggregate measure. On average, the share of resources that are diverted illegally in the
procurement of public works is 1.7 percentage points higher among second-term mayors than
ﬁrst-term mayors (standard error is 0.7).
When corruption is measured as either the incidence of irregularities or the share of service
20Approximately 89 percent of the incidences of illegal procurement practices and funds diversion have a value.
21If anything we are underestimating the eﬀect of re-election incentives on the share of total resources associated
with corruption, because the proportion of these irregularities is 4 percentage points higher for second-term
mayors, although not statistically signiﬁcant.
22In general, we see that a large number of irregularities occur in the areas of education and health, sectors
that were decentralized during of the late 1980s. See Ferraz and Finan (2007) for a more detailed account of the
distribution of corruption practices across types and sectors.
9items, columns 4-9 of Table 2 provide further evidence in support of the theoretical predictions.
Compared to ﬁrst-term mayors, second-term mayors commit 0.11 and 0.23 more irregularities
in the diversion of funds and illegal procurement practices respectively, which represent 0.4 and
0.7 percentage points diﬀerences in the share of services items audited.
4.3 Data on Municipal Characteristics
The other data sources used in the analysis were obtained from the Brazilian Institute of Geog-
raphy and Statistics (Instituto Brasileiro de Geograﬁa e Estat´ ıstica (IBGE)), Tribunal Superior
Eleitoral (TSE), and Tesouro Nacional. The richness of these data allows us to control for a large
number of municipal characteristics that are likely to be correlated with corruption practices and
whose absence might otherwise confound our estimates. See the data appendix for a detailed
description of data sources.
Table 3 compares diﬀerences in mean characteristics of municipalities with a ﬁrst-term to
municipalities with a second-term mayor. Because of our lack of experimental design and the need
to assume selection on observable characteristics, it is useful to understand if the determinants of
corruption are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent across the municipalities. As the table demonstrates, there
are few diﬀerences in observable characteristics between these municipalities. Out of 43 variables,
only 5 are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent at a 95 percent level of conﬁdence.23 There is a signiﬁcant
diﬀerence between ﬁrst and second-term mayors in our measures of electoral performance for
the 2000 municipal elections. This is not too surprising given that incumbents tend to have an
advantage in elections. The other signiﬁcant diﬀerences are the proportion of the population
with at least a secondary school education and the share of the population that lives in urban
areas; characteristics that are fairly correlated. In fact, the diﬀerences in the share of the urban
population loses statistical signiﬁcant once we account for the diﬀerences in secondary school
attainment.
5 Empirical Strategy
Our main objective is to test whether re-election incentives aﬀect the level of political corruption
in a municipality. As the theory presented in section 2 predicts, mayors who face re-election
incentives should, on average, be less corrupt than those who are no longer eligible for re-
election. To estimate the eﬀects of re-election incentives, the ideal experiment would have been
to randomly assign the possibility of re-election across municipalities and then measure the
diﬀerences in corruption levels across these two groups of municipalities among mayors in their
ﬁrst term of oﬃce. Unfortunately, this experiment design does not exist and given the cross-
23We report the 19 most important variables that are later used in our speciﬁcations.
10sectional nature of our data, we instead compare mayors in their ﬁrst term, who still face re-
election incentives, to second-term mayors using the following regression:
ri = βIi + Xiϕ + Ziγ + εi, (1)
where ri is the level of corruption for municipality i, and Ii indicates whether the mayor is in
his ﬁrst term. The vector Xi is a set of municipal characteristics and the vector Zi is a set of
mayor characteristics that determine the municipality’s level of corruption. The term εi denotes
unobserved (to the econometrician) municipal and mayor characteristics thought to determine
corruption.
In estimating equation 1, we face two main empirical challenges. First, without random
assignment of re-election incentives, unobserved characteristics of the municipality and the mayor
that aﬀect both re-election and local corruption (e.g. political ability and campaigning eﬀort)
will bias a simple OLS regression. Second, even if ﬁrst and second-term mayor were randomly
assigned, the ﬁnding that second-term mayors are more corrupt could be due to the fact that
they have more experience.
To illustrate these potential biases, consider a simple model that expresses the diﬀerence in
corruption level between ﬁrst and second-term mayors in terms of potential outcomes. Let rDT
t
be the level of rents extracted by a politician at term t in a municipality where mayors can be
re-elected to a second term, i.e. a double-term regime, DT. The simple comparison between
mayors in their ﬁrst and second term is:
∆ = E[r
DT
2 |τ = 2] − E[r
DT
1 |τ = 1]
where τ denotes a ﬁrst or second term mayor. Let rST
t denote the levels of rents at term t in
a municipality where there are no possibilities of re-election, i.e. a single-term regime, ST. We
can rewrite this simple diﬀerence as:
∆ = E[r
DT
2 |τ = 2] − E[r
ST
1 |τ = 1] + (E[r
ST
1 |τ = 1] − E[r
DT
1 |τ = 1]) (2)
= E[r
DT
2 |τ = 2] − E[r
ST
1 |τ = 1] + β
where E[rST
1 |τ = 1] is the expected level of rent extraction in the ﬁrst period among ﬁrst-term
mayors who do not face re-election incentives and β measures the causal eﬀects of re-election
incentives on corruption.
To see the diﬀerent sources of biases, Equation 2 can be decomposed further as follows:
∆ = β + E[r
DT
2 |τ = 2] − E[r
ST





1 |τ = 2] − E[r
ST




11The ﬁrst diﬀerence represents the potential bias associate with the eﬀects of political experience
on corruption. It compares the corruption level of a second-term mayor in his second-term
(i.e. t = 2) of a double-term regime to the amount of corruption the same mayor would have
committed in the ﬁrst period (i.e. t = 1) of a single-term regime. The second diﬀerence captures
any bias associated with diﬀerences in either political ability or unobserved municipal level
determinants of corruption. It measures the diﬀerence in the amount of corruption between
what a second-term mayor would have committed in his ﬁrst term of a single-term regime and
what a ﬁrst-term mayor commits in the ﬁrst term of a single-term regime. Thus, assuming that
these diﬀerences are not zero then the simple OLS estimation of equation 1 will yield biased
estimates.
5.1 Controlling for Political Ability and Other Potential Confounds
To account for any unobserved diﬀerences in either political ability or municipal level charac-
teristics between ﬁrst and second term mayor, we employ two diﬀerent identiﬁcation strategies.
First, using a regression discontinuity analysis, we compare municipalities where incumbent may-
ors barely won reelection in 2000 (and thus served as a second-term mayor from 2001-2004) to
municipalities where the incumbent barely lost the election and thus was replaced by a new
mayor (who then served as a ﬁrst term between 2001-2004). As discussed in Lee (2008), close
elections provide a quasi-random assignment of municipalities with a ﬁrst versus second-term
mayor. Thus, by comparing elections where the incumbents won or lost by a narrow margin,
we control for many of the unobserved characteristics of the municipality that determine both
re-election and corruption levels, such as the quality of pool of candidates or the amount of
campaign resources.24
To exploit the discontinuity in margin of victory which re-elects the incumbent mayor, we
modify equation 1 to estimate the following model:
ri = βIi + f(Wi) + Xiϕ + Ziγ + εi
Ii = 1[Wi ≥ 0]
where Wi denotes the diﬀerence in vote shares between the incumbent and the second place
candidate, and f(Wi) is a smooth continuous function of margin of victory. As is typically
the case in a regression discontinuity framework, there is a tradeoﬀ between precision and bias,
particularly as one moves away from the discontinuity. In section 6, we present estimates that
are robust to various functional form assumptions for f(Wi).
Our second approach addresses diﬀerences in unobserved political ability by comparing
24Dal B´ o, Dal B´ o, and Snyder (2008), Ferreira and Gyourko (2007), Lee, Moretti, and Butler (2004), Linden
(2004) also apply regression discontinuity techniques in the context of elections.
12second-term mayors with a subset of ﬁrst-term mayors that were able to get re-elected in 2004
elections. If the bias from the OLS regression comes from unobserved political ability that pos-
itively selects more able politicians into a second-term, this approach controls for a signiﬁcant
portion of this bias by comparing mayors that are as politically able as second-term mayors.
5.2 Controlling for Experience
If there is a learning process associated with corruption or if it simply takes time to establish
the networks that enable corruption, then the diﬀerence in corruption levels between ﬁrst and
second-term mayors may not only reﬂect re-election incentives but also political experience.25
We test for this possibility using two diﬀerent approaches. First, to account for the fact that
second-term mayors are more experienced, we collect data on all mayors who held a political
position as either mayor or local legislator during the 1989-1992, 1993-1996, and 1997-2000
administrations and match them to those in power during 2001-2004. We can then compare the
corruption of mayors facing a second-term with those mayors serving on a ﬁrst-term, but who
have had previous political experience. Second, we compare ﬁrst-term mayors to second-term
mayors that became candidates in either the governor or legislative elections in 2006. According
to theory, second-term mayors who still have career concerns and run for higher oﬃces should
behave similarly to ﬁrst-term mayors. Moreover, such a prediction would be inconsistent with a
learning-by-doing hypothesis, where even those second-term mayors with re-election incentives
would still be more corrupt than ﬁrst-term mayors.
6 Empirical Results
This section provides evidence that municipalities where mayors face re-election incentives are
associated with signiﬁcantly lower levels of corruption, as measured by the share of resources
appropriated. These ﬁndings are robust to alternative deﬁnitions of corruption, as well as various
speciﬁcations and estimation techniques. We also explore how re-election incentives vary with
local characteristics and ﬁnd that the eﬀects are stronger among municipalities where the cost
of rent extraction are lower and political competition is higher. All these results are consistent
with the basic predictions of a standard political agency model. We conclude this section with
additional results that address several potential threats to our identiﬁcation assumptions.
25As long as reducing corruption increases one chances of getting re-elected then theoretically it is unlikely that
any diﬀerence between ﬁrst and second-term mayors is strictly due to a ’learning-by-doing’ process.
13Basic Results on Corruption
Table 4 presents regression results from estimating several variants to Equation 1, where the
dependent variable is the share of resources that were indicated as corruption. Column 1 reports
the unadjusted relationship between whether the mayor is in his ﬁrst term and the share of
funds appropriated. The remaining columns correspond to speciﬁcations that include additional
sets of controls. The speciﬁcations presented in columns 2-4 account for variation in mayors,
demographic and institutional characteristics of the municipality, whereas the speciﬁcations in
columns 5 and 6 include, in addition to the other controls, indicators for when the municipality
was selected for audit (lottery intercepts) and state intercepts. The speciﬁcation presented in
column 6, where re-election incentives are identiﬁed from only within state and lottery variation,
accounts for any state-speciﬁc or lottery-speciﬁc unobservable that might have aﬀected political
corruption. It also controls for any diﬀerences across states (and in eﬀect across time) for how
the municipalities may have been audited.
From the bivariate relationship in column 1, we see that ﬁrst-term mayors are associated
with a 2.0 percentage point decrease in corruption. At an average corruption level of 0.074
among second-term mayors, this estimate represents a 27 percent decline. As seen in the other
columns, the inclusion of additional controls has a minimal eﬀect on the point estimate. For
example in column 6, which controls for state and lottery intercepts and various mayor and
municipal characteristics, including the amount of resources transferred to the municipality, the
estimated eﬀect is slightly larger in magnitude (point estimate =-0.027; and standard error
0.011), but statistically indistinguishable from the estimate of the unadjusted regression (F( 1,
409) = 0.44; P-value = 0.5076). If we consider that on average R$5,459,054 was transferred to
these municipalities, lame-duck mayors misappropriate approximately R$148,000 (US $60,000)
more than ﬁrst-term mayors.
Columns 7 and 8 of Table 4 present the estimated eﬀect of re-election incentives based
on diﬀerent functional form assumptions. In column 7, we display the estimated eﬀects for
our corruption measure using a bias-adjusted matching estimator (Abadie and Imbens 2006).
Although compared to the regression analysis the identiﬁcation assumptions are similar, the
matching estimator has the advantage that it neither assumes a functional form nor extrapolates
over areas of uncommon support in the observable characteristics. In addition, to the matching
estimator, we also estimate a Tobit model to account for the left censoring of municipalities with
zero share of corruption (displayed in the column 8). For each alternative speciﬁcation, the point
estimates are consistent to the OLS estimates presented in the other columns. Using the Tobit
model, the marginal eﬀects for the entire sample increase in magnitude to -0.042 (standard error
= 0.012) compared to -0.027 (standard error = 0.011) in the OLS regression.
Table 5 reports the estimated eﬀect of re-election incentives using our two alternative mea-
sures of corruption. Columns 1-4 compares the number of irregularities associated with cor-
14ruption between ﬁrst and second-term mayors, whereas columns 5-8 estimate the relationship
for the share of service items related to corruption (number of corrupt irregularities divided by
the number of audited items). For each measure, we report the unadjusted relationship, the
most complete model, and alternative functional forms. Under our full speciﬁcation, ﬁrst-term
mayors are associated with 0.467 fewer acts of corruption (column 2). When compared to aver-
age corruption among second-term mayors, this eﬀect represents a 22 percent decline. We also
ﬁnd that ﬁrst-term mayors are signiﬁcantly less corrupt when measured by the share of service
items found to be corrupt.26 By this measure, ﬁrst-term mayors are 23 percent less corrupt
than second-term mayors. As the remaining columns demonstrate, these estimates are robust
to alternative speciﬁcations and estimation procedures. Together these ﬁndings suggest that
mayors who still face the possibility of re-election engage in less corrupt activities than mayors
who may have a shorter political horizon.
Accounting for Political Ability and Other Potential Confounds
Thus far, our results show that there is less corruption in municipalities governed by ﬁrst-
term mayors. Although this is consistent with the eﬀects of re-election incentives, there are
alternative interpretations for these ﬁndings. One possibility is that our estimates are capturing
some unobserved characteristics of the municipality or the mayor that increases both re-election
rates and corruption levels. For instance, ﬁrst and second-term mayors might diﬀer in political
ability. If a mayor’s ability increases his re-election probability and enables him to be more
corrupt, then our estimates are potentially biased upwards.
In this section, we address these concerns using two approaches. First, we identify the
eﬀects of re-election incentives using elections where the incumbents won or lost by a narrow
margin. As we discussed in Section 5, this regression discontinuity approach provides quasi-
random assignment of ﬁrst-term mayors (municipalities where incumbents barely lost re-election)
and second-term mayors (municipalities where incumbents barely won re-election) for the subset
of municipalities where the incumbent ran for re-election.27 In addition to the RDD approach,
we also present estimates where we compare second-term mayors to a subset of ﬁrst-term mayors
that were able to get reelected at the end of their terms. If the bias from the OLS regression
comes from unobserved political ability that positively selects more able politicians into a second-
term, this approach controls for a signiﬁcant portion of this bias by comparing mayors that are
as politically able as second-term mayors.
26This measure addresses the concern that municipalities with second-term mayors may have had more items
audited. Alternatively, when we control for the number of service items audited in the speciﬁcations presented
in columns 1-4, the estimate remain almost identical.
27Note that this identiﬁcation strategy still does not allow us to disentangle the eﬀects of re-election incentives
from a simple model of learning by doing. It also does not control for underlying diﬀerences in the individual
politicians. We account for these possibilities in the next set of robustness checks.
15Results from these two approaches are shown in Table 6. In columns 1-3 we present results
from a Regression Discontinuity Design speciﬁcation where the running variable is the diﬀerence
in vote share between the incumbent and the runner-up (or the winner if the incumbent lost the
election).28 In column 2 we control linearly for the diﬀerence in vote shares while in columns 3 and
4 we include a quadratic and a cubic term respectively. The results are robust to these various
functional form assumptions with the coeﬃcient on the ﬁrst-term indicator varying between -
0.029 and -0.037 (standard errors varying from 0.017 to 0.020). For instance, allowing for a cubic
polynomial in the incumbent’s margin of victory, we see that compared to second-term mayors,
ﬁrst-term mayors are 3.7 percentage points less corrupt.29
The results from comparing the corruption levels of second-term mayors to the set of ﬁrst-
term mayors that get re-elected are presented in columns 4 and 5 of Table 6. The coeﬃcient
on the ﬁrst-term indicator increases in magnitude to -0.040 (standard error=0.013), suggesting
that second-term mayors extract a higher level of rents from oﬃce even compared to ﬁrst-term
mayors of similar political ability. It is important to note however that the larger coeﬃcient on
the ﬁrst-term dummy was expected because the dissemination of the audit program decreased
the probability that corrupt mayors were re-elected (see Ferraz and Finan (2008)). To control
for the eﬀects of the audits, we use an alternative strategy where we estimate the probability of
re-election using the sample of mayors that were audited only after the 2004 elections (and hence
voters did not have this information) and compute the predicted probability of a ﬁrst-term mayor
getting re-elected.30 After controlling for the eﬀects of the audits, the point estimate reduces to
-0.034 (standard error 0.017) and is still signiﬁcant at 90 percent conﬁdence.
Controlling for Experience and Learning-by-Doing
Politicians in power for a longer period of time may learn corruption practices and establish
networks that enable them to be more corrupt. If this was the case, the estimated diﬀerences
28The sample size drops to 328 because some incumbents in 2000 do not run for reelection. Although this is
a select sample, column 1 in Appendix Table 1 replicates our main speciﬁcation that compares ﬁrst and second-
terms excluding municipalities where the incumbent did not run in the 2000 election. The estimated eﬀect (point
estimate = -0.02; standard error =0.011) is similar both statistically and in magnitude to the eﬀect for the overall
sample.
29We also estimate alternative speciﬁcations where we allow the slope to vary across each side of the zero vote
margin discontinuity with a linear, quadratic and cubic splines. The results are shown in table 1 in the Appendix
and provide similar coeﬃcients, although we lose some precision in the point estimates due to the small sample.
Results for the other measures of corruption display similar patterns and are available upon request.
30We constructed a propensity score for whether the mayor was re-elected in the 2004 elections using various
mayor and municipal characteristics. These characteristics included: the mayor’s gender, education, marriage
status, age, and party aﬃliation dummies; the municipality’s log population, population with secondary school
education, age of municipality, log GDP per capita, income equality, share of the legislative branch that supports
the mayor, eﬀective number of parties in 2000 election, an indicator for whether there is a judge in the municipality,
state ﬁxed eﬀects. The predicted indicator is equal to one if the propensity score was greater than or equal to
0.5. The estimation predicted 64 percent of the cases correctly.
16in corruption between ﬁrst and second-term mayors might just reﬂect the corruption know-how
accumulated over time rather than the eﬀects of re-election incentives. In this section we provide
evidence that although second-term mayors have more political experience, these additional years
in oﬃce cannot fully explain the diﬀerential corruption of ﬁrst and second-term mayors.31
We start by identifying the 2001-2004 mayors who were either in power during the 1989-1992,
1993-1996 administrations or served as local legislators during the 1997-2000 administration.32
If the diﬀerence in corruption levels between ﬁrst and second-term mayors is largely due to
experience then we would expect ﬁrst-term mayors who had previously been in power to have
similar corruption levels to second-term mayors. In column 1, Table 7, we re-estimate our basic
speciﬁcation, but control for an indicator for whether the ﬁrst-term mayor was in power in one
of the three previous terms (12 years). The point estimate of -0.031 (standard error=0.012) is
almost identical to the original point estimate of -0.027 in column 6, Table 4.33
An alternative way to account for previous experience is to compare second-term mayors with
only ﬁrst-term mayors who have previously been in power. Hence, we re-estimate the baseline
regression using all second-term mayors, but restrict ﬁrst-term mayors to only those that have
been mayors before (either from 1988-1992 or 1993-1996). The coeﬃcient on ﬁrst-term, shown in
Table 7, column 2, is -0.039 (standard error= 0.014) further suggesting that political experience
does not entirely drive the diﬀerence in corruption levels between ﬁrst and second-term mayors.
One potential criticism to this approach is that the political networks built by a mayor during
1992-1996 might be lost when he spends time away from oﬃce before returning in 2001. Hence,
we compute an alternative measure of political experience where we also take into account ﬁrst-
term mayors that served as local legislators during the previous administration (1996-2000).34
In column 3, Table 7, we re-estimate the basic model comparing second-term mayors to ﬁrst-
term mayors that have had previous political experience, including experience as local legislators
during the previous term. The estimated diﬀerence in corruption between ﬁrst and second-term
mayors decreases slightly to 2.9 percentage points (standard error=0.016). Finally, in column
4 of Table 7, we compare the corruption level of second-term mayors to ﬁrst-term mayors that
have previously been in power and are high ability mayors (were re-elected in the 2004 election).
The coeﬃcient estimated on the ﬁrst-term dummy is again -0.056 (standard-error=0.018).35
31In fact, the possibility of re-election was only introduced in 1997, but mayors could be re-elected after a
one-term hiatus. One concern is that in eﬀect mayors do not face term limits because they can run again after
being out for one-term. For our purposes, this mis-measurement of the politician’s political horizon implies that
we would be underestimating the eﬀects of re-election incentives.
32Since these data are not available on electronic format, we called each one of the 26 state level electoral courts
(TRE) and obtained the names of elected mayors in the 1988 and 1992 elections. We could not obtain records
before 1988 since they are not systematically recorded across states.
33Although not reported, all of the results presented in this section, as well as the others, are similar when
using the other corruption measures.
34There are 27 (11 percent) ﬁrst-term mayors that served as local legislators from 1996-2000.
35If we use the predicted indicator for re-election our point estimate falls to -0.043 (standard error =0.028),
which although measured with less precision, is again consistent with the other estimates.
17Corruption and Future Career Concerns
We have interpreted the coeﬃcient on the ﬁrst-term indicator as evidence that mayors who face
re-election incentives engage, on average, in less corrupt activities. Second-term mayors however
may have other political aspirations and it is often the case that some mayors in Brazil continue
their political careers as state level legislators or federal deputies.36 The theory would therefore
suggest that second-term mayors who still have career concerns and run for higher oﬃces should
behave similarly to ﬁrst-term mayors. To test this, we gather data from the 2006 governor and
legislative elections and match the names of candidates to those mayors that were in power from
2001-2004. Out of the 485 mayors in power during the 2001-2004 term nine percent ran for oﬃce
in 2006.
In column 5 of table 7, we restrict the sample to only second-term mayors and run a regression
of corruption on an indicator for whether the second-term mayor ran for a higher level oﬃce in
2006. Again as the theory suggests, we ﬁnd that second-term mayors with career concerns are
4.9 percentage points less corrupt than second-term mayors without career concerns.
While these estimates support a model of re-election incentives, one potential problem with
this test is that the decision to run for a higher-level oﬃce might be endogenous to the level of
corruption uncovered in the audits. While we acknowledge that this result should be interpreted
with caution, accusations of corruption and crimes in Brazil seem to have greater impacts on local
elections compared to national elections and it is unlikely that accusations of local corruption
will aﬀect nominations for high level oﬃces37 – for instance, approximately 35 percent of federal
congressmen and 30 percent of senators are accused of crimes that were committed before taking
oﬃce.38
Local Context and Re-election Incentives
In this section we explore the extent to which the eﬀects of re-election incentives on corruption
might vary according to local characteristics that aﬀect electoral accountability. In order to shed
light on the empirical results, we start by discussing some natural extensions to the simple model
presented in Section 2. The asymmetry of information between voters and politicians lies at the
heart of political agency models. Hence, factors that inﬂuence access to information may aﬀect
how re-election incentives aﬀect corruption.39 Suppose for instance that with some probability
voters observe their politician’s type after he has chosen his action and before the election is held.
As the likelihood that a corrupt politician is detected in the ﬁrst period increases (i.e. voters have
36In the 2006 election, for example, out of the 246 newly elected deputies, 13 percent were ex-mayors (BBC
Brazil).
37Even though Ferraz and Finan (2008) ﬁnd that the audit reports reduced the likelihood of reelection on
among mayors, they do not ﬁnd evidence that the audits reduced the likelihood of running for re-election.
38See the report from Transparencia Brasil at: http://www.excelencias.org.br/excelencias.pdf .
39The framework used for discussing the eﬀects of information on corruption is based on Besley (2006).
18more information), a corrupt politician will be less likely to pool with non-corrupt politicians,
and hence discipline will be reduced. But as corrupt politicians become less disciplined, they are
less likely to survive into a second-period and the quality of the average politician that survives
into a second-mandate improves. Hence, the overall eﬀect of an increase of information that
allows voters to identify politicians’ type is ambiguous– corruption will decrease in the second
period and potentially increase in the ﬁrst because those corrupt mayors will now extract as
much rent as they can in the ﬁrst period. Empirically, with a cross-section of mayors, one would
expect that the diﬀerence in corruption between ﬁrst and second-term mayors to be smaller
in municipalities where there is more access to information that allows voters to uncover the
politician’s type (e.g. presence of local radio).
An additional source of heterogeneity stems from diﬀerences across municipalities in the po-
tential punishment of engaging in corruption. For instance, the probability of being prosecuted
and punished for corruption charges is likely to be higher in municipalities where the judiciary
has a public prosecutor, thus increasing the cost of engaging in corrupt activities. As corruption
costs increase, thus reducing the future beneﬁts of rent extraction, politicians will become less
disciplined and the selection eﬀect will increase. Therefore, we would expect that in municipal-
ities where the costs of engaging in corruption are higher, the diﬀerence in corruption between
ﬁrst and second-term mayors will also be lower.
Political competition may also determine how re-election incentives aﬀect corruption. An
increase in electoral advantage will reduce the disciplining eﬀect, as the probability of being
re-elected increases, even if the corrupt mayor does not pretend to be non-corrupt. Thus, the
diﬀerence between ﬁrst and second-term mayors is less in municipalities where the elections are
less competitive.
Finally, a mayor’s political support might aﬀect corruption choices. If the mayor has a
majority in the local legislature, he will be able to pass legislations, increase public employment
and adopt other strategies that increase his re-election chances. Everything else constant, he
can be less disciplined and still get reelected into a second-term. Thus, we expect the diﬀerence
in corruption between ﬁrst and second term mayors to decrease as the support in the local
legislature increase.
In Table 8 we show the results using as proxies for these local characteristics: the presence
of a judge, the existence of local radio, political competition, and the share of local legislators
that belong to the same party as the mayor.40
The presence of public prosecutors or a local media reduces the corruption diﬀerential between
ﬁrst-term and second-term mayors. Among municipalities with public prosecutors, there is only
40In Brazil, the presence of a judge depends on whether the unicipality is a judiciary district (comarca), which
in turn depends on local characteristics such as population, local revenues and the number of judiciary processes.
The presence of local radios have an important eﬀect in revealing the type of politician, see Ferraz and Finan
(2008).
19a small diﬀerence in corruption levels between ﬁrst and second-term mayors (column 1), and in
municipalities with local media - in the form of either radio or newspaper - the diﬀerence is only
1.4 percentage points (column 2). In contrast, among municipalities where there does not exist
any local media, second-term mayors are almost 10 percentage points (standard error=0.03)
more corrupt than ﬁrst-term mayors, which represents an average R$523,000 (US$237,592).
Columns 3 and 4 report how the second-term eﬀect varies with the degree of political com-
petition, as measured by the proportion of the local council that is from the same party as the
mayor (column 3) and a political Herﬁndahl index in the previous election (column 4).41 As
reported in column 3, political competition increases the diﬀerence in corruption levels between
ﬁrst and second-term mayors. When only 9 percent of the legislative council is from the same
political party as the mayor (5th percentile of the distribution), there an 8.8 percentage point
diﬀerence between ﬁrst and second-term mayors. Whereas, when the political support of the
incumbent mayor represents 55 percent of the legislative branch, then there is no diﬀerence in
corruption levels between ﬁrst and second-term mayors. The results reported in Column 4 tell
a similar story. For instance, among municipalities where the Heﬁndahl index was 0.08 (the
1st percentile of the distribution), ﬁrst-term mayors are 3.9 percentage points less corrupt that
second-term mayors. In contrast, when elections are less competitive at 0.528 (the 99 percentile
of the distribution), the diﬀerence in corruption levels between ﬁrst and second-term mayors is
-0.007. In eﬀect, the results presented in columns (3) and (4) suggest that municipalities char-
acterized by low competition exhibit no diﬀerential eﬀect in rent-extraction between ﬁrst and
second-term mayors. First-term mayors with an extreme electoral advantage can aﬀord to be as
corrupt as a lame-duck mayor since his re-election is practically guaranteed.
7 Discussion
Our analysis shows that mayors who can be held accountable at the polls will engage in less
corruption. First-term mayors misappropriate 27 percent less resources than second-term mayors
even when accounting for potential biases in political ability and experience. Our ﬁndings support
a political agency model where mayors with re-election incentives refrain from rent extraction in
order to increase their likelihood of re-election.
An obvious concern in interpreting the relationship between re-election incentives and cor-
ruption is that it may simply reﬂect corruption on the part of the auditors. Because ﬁrst-term
mayors have more incentive to bribe the auditors for a more favorable report, we could be cap-
turing the eﬀects of re-election incentives on bribing rather than the eﬀects of career concerns
on actual corruption. While it is diﬃcult to test this hypothesis directly, we provide suggestive
evidence that this is not the case. For instance, if ﬁrst-term mayors are more likely to bribe au-
41The Herﬁndahl index is computed by dividing one by the eﬀective number of political parties.
20ditors, we might expect ﬁrst-term mayors who were audited during the election year or aﬃliated
with either the federal government or state government to receive more favorable reports.
We explore these possibilities in Table 9. In columns 1-3 we regress our measure of corruption
on the ﬁrst-term indicator and interaction terms with variables that would suggest larger incen-
tives for bribing the auditors. In column 1 we test for diﬀerential auditing according to whether
the municipality was drawn to be audited during the 2004 election year. We show that there is
no diﬀerence in corruption levels between ﬁrst and second-term mayors depending on whether
they were audited during the electoral year or not (coeﬃcient= 0.001, standard error=0.017).
We also do not ﬁnd any diﬀerential eﬀects by whether the mayor belongs to the same party of
the president – the PT (Worker’s Party) – (column 2) or the state governor (column 3).42 An
alternative way in which auditors may have favored ﬁrst-term mayors could have been to audit
less valued projects. Although this is unlikely to explain the patterns that we ﬁnd in the main
regressions, we regress the value of projects audited, expressed in logarithms, on an indicator
for whether the mayor is in a ﬁrst-term. As reported in column 4, we again do not any ﬁnd
statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the amount of resources audited between ﬁrst and second
term-mayors and do not ﬁnd a diﬀerential eﬀect if the municipality was audit during the 2004
electoral year (column 5).
In addition to the previous analysis, there are several reasons why it is unlikely that diﬀerences
in corruption between ﬁrst and second-term mayors reﬂect corrupt auditors. First, they are
federal public employees hired based on a highly competitive public examination and high salary.
Moreover, each team of auditors reports to a regional supervisor. Therefore, not only is it hard
to cheat individually, but also the cost of getting caught is large. According to program oﬃcials,
there has never been an incidence in which auditors have even been caught receiving bribes.43
Another explanation for the diﬀerence in reported corruption levels is that lame duck mayors,
who are no longer accountable to voters, simply have less incentive to hide or are less careful in
their attempt to hide corruption. Although this hypothesis is in many respects observationally
equivalent to what we ﬁnd, it is unlikely that this could explain the estimated eﬀects since this
program was unexpected and the audits were based on past behavior. Moreover, although second
term mayors may not face electoral retribution, they also have an incentive to hide corruption
due to potential judiciary prosecution.
Finally, given our ﬁndings, it is natural to ask whether a two-term limit system is optimal to
reduce the incentives for rent-extraction. Although Smart and Sturm (2006) provide theoretical
justiﬁcation for why a two-term limit regime might be optimal under some conditions, we are
unfortunately unable to test this. Unlike the variation that exists in term-limits across the U.S.,
42Ferraz and Finan (2008) compare corruption levels using the count measure between ﬁrst-term mayors that
were audited before the election versus after the election. It does not ﬁnd any evidence that corruption levels
diﬀered between these two groups along various dimensions.
43Based on the interviews conducted by the authors with program oﬃcials in Brasilia.
21our research design can only identify the eﬀects of re-election incentives on corruption under a
two-term regime relative to a one-term regime. We cannot estimate for instance how politicians
would behave if they were elected for a third term or even re-elected indeﬁnitely.
8 Conclusions
Voters have imperfect information about politicians’ actions. Thus, the incentives provided by
elections act as a disciplining device to constrain politicians’ malfeasance. In this paper we test
whether political institutions that provide electoral accountability through the possibility of re-
election reduces corruption. We build a new dataset of corruption practices by local politicians in
Brazil using reports from an ambitious anti-corruption program designed to audit a municipality’s
use of federal funds. We exploit the variation in electoral incentives provided by term limits and
show that ﬁrst-term mayors are associated with signiﬁcantly less corruption than second-term
mayors, as measured by either the share of resources misappropriated, the share of service items
related to corruption, or the number of corrupt irregularities. The reduction in corruption
practices induced by electoral accountability is not only statistical signiﬁcant, but economically
important. Assuming that, in the absence of re-election incentives, ﬁrst-term mayors would
behave as second-term mayors, we estimate that re-election incentives are responsible for inducing
a reduction in resources misappropriated in the order of R$433 million (US$160 million). This
is more than half of what the federal government spent in the Bolsa Escola conditional cash
transfer program for all municipalities in Brazil during 2002.
The diﬀerence in corruption between ﬁrst and second-term mayors is remarkably robust to
various speciﬁcations and alternative interpretations. We show that there is more corruption in
municipalities governed by second-term mayors even when compared to ﬁrst-term mayors that
have been in power in a previous mandate (experienced politicians). Our ﬁndings also suggest
that the eﬀects of re-election incentives on corruption depend on local characteristics. The
estimated diﬀerential eﬀect between ﬁrst and second-term mayors is more pronounced among
municipalities where the cost of corruption is higher - as measured by the presence of a judge -
and also where access to information and political support is lower. We also ﬁnd that second-
term mayors facing term-limits who later pursue further a political career behave as ﬁrst-term
mayors and engage in less corrupt activities.
These results can be explained by a simple political agency model similar to Besley (2006) and
Smart and Sturm (2006) where the possibility of re-election creates both discipline and selection
eﬀects. Although second-term mayors face a shorter political horizon and thus have less incentive
to accommodate voters’ preferences, rational voters will elect into a lame-duck term politicians
that are less corrupt than average. Hence, such a positive selection may counteract any adverse
incentive eﬀect induced by term-limits. Our analysis tries to account for the importance of
22this selection eﬀect by comparing second-term mayors with ﬁrst-term mayors that later got re-
elected into a second term and shows that second-term mayors are signiﬁcantly more corrupt.
We interpret this as evidence that, in the context of Brazil’s local governments, the discipline
eﬀect dominates the selection eﬀect inducing ﬁrst-term mayors with re-election incentives to
extract fewer rents from power.44
Overall, the ﬁndings suggest that electoral rules that enhance political accountability play a
crucial role in constraining politician’s corrupt behavior even in an institutional context where
corruption is pervasive and elites dominate local politics. Despite this positive eﬀect of re-election
incentives on constraining corruption, further research is needed in order to assess whether elec-
toral accountability aﬀects other aspects of governance and ultimately improves voters’ welfare.
44Our results also complement Alt, de Mesquita, and Rose (2007) who examines the accountability and selection
eﬀects for the case of ﬁscal policy in the U.S. using variation in term-limits across governors.
23Appendix A: Coding the Audit Reports
This appendix explains how we used the audit reports to construct indicators of corruption.
We provide the deﬁnition used for each type of irregularity and include an illustrative example
drawn from the reports.45
Examples of Political Corruption
Health related purchases without procurement using false receipts: The ministry of Health
transferred to the municipality R$ 321,700 for the Programa de Aten¸ c˜ ao Bsica. The mu-
nicipal government used fake receipts valued at R$ 166,000 to provide proof of purchase.
Furthermore, there is no proof that the goods were purchased since there were no registered
entries of the merchandize in the stock. Also, in 2003 the municipality bought medicines
valued at R$253,300 without procurement. In 2004, the value was R$113,700, also without
procurement. We classiﬁed this violation as an incidence of irregular procurement and
diversion of public funds in the area of health. We valued this irregularity as a diversion
of R$166,000. This irregularity occurred in Capelinha, Minas Gerais, drawn by lottery
number 9.
Evidence of irregularities in well construction: The Ministry of National Integration trans-
ferred R$117,037 to the municipality for the maintenance of water infra-structure. The
working plan speciﬁed the maintenance of ten wells and four dams. None of these repairs
were made. Instead, the dam Henrique Dantas, located inside a private farm was repaired.
We classiﬁed this violation as an incidence of diversion of public funds in the area of water
and sanitation. We valued this irregularity as a diversion of R$117,037. This irregularity
occurred in Santa Cruz, Rio Grande do Norte, drawn by lottery number 9.
Over-invoice of more than R$3 million in road construction: The ﬁrm Mazda was hired,
without procurement, to build approximatly nine kilometers of a road. The cost of the
construction was estimated at R$ 1 million based on similar constructions. The receipts
presented by Mazda and paid by the government totalled R$ 5 million. No further doc-
umentation was shown by the municipal government proving the need for the additional
amount of resources. The auditors found that the ﬁrm Mazda, did not have any experi-
ence with construction and had sub-contracted the ﬁrm CTE for R$ 1.8 million to do the
construction. Hence, the project was over paid by more than R$ 3 million. As evidence
of corruption, it was late found that the ﬁrm Mazda gave an apartment for the mayor
and his family valued at R$600,000 suggesting a kickback. We classiﬁed this violation as
an incidence of over-invoice in the area of infrastructure. We valued this irregularity as a
45For access to the summary of the audit reports, see www.cgu.gov.br
24diversion of R$3.2 million. This irregularity occurred in S˜ ao Francisco do Conde, Bahia,
drawn by lottery number 6.
Appendix B: Data Sources
The data used in the paper comes from a variety of sources. The data is at the level of the
municipality, the lowest government unit below a state in Brazil.
Municipal demographic characteristics: The 2000 population census provides socio-economic
and demographic characteristics of municipalities. The variables we include in our analysis
are: population size, percentage of urban households, Gini coeﬃcient and the percentage
of adults with secondary education. In addition, we also include the level of income mea-
sured by municipal GDP per capita estimated by the IBGE. These variables are important
determinants of corruption as shown by Glaeser and Saks (2006) and Treisman (2000).
Municipal institutional and public management characteristics: Our second complemen-
tary data source from IBGE is a municipality survey, Perﬁl dos Munic´ ıpios Brasileiros:
Gest˜ ao P´ ublica, conducted in 1999 and 2001. The survey provides structural features of
the municipality such as the existence of local daily newspaper, radio, local public pros-
ecutors and the age of the municipality. These data also characterize various aspects of
the public administration, including the existence of laws which govern its budgetary and
planning procedures.
Election data: Results from 2000 and 2004 mayor elections are available from the Tribunal
Superior Eleitoral (TSE). These data contain vote totals for each candidate by municipal-
ity, along with various individual characteristics such as the candidate’s gender, education,
occupation, and party aﬃliation. We use this information to construct measures of elec-
toral performance, and to control for individual mayor characteristics that might aﬀect
corruption. We also use the TSE data to build measures of mayor’s political support in
the local legislature as well as the size of the legislature.
Public ﬁnance data: Finally, we use public ﬁnance data, FINBRA, from the Tesouro Nacional
(National Treasury) to construct a measure of intergovernmental transfers received by
municipalities. These data control for potential diﬀerences in the amount of resources
received from the state and federal governments across municipalities.
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Proportion of municipalities with at least one irregularity 0.535 0.571 0.069 0.780
(0.500) (0.490) (0.253) (0.414)
Conditional on at least one irregularity
Average number of irregularities 1.688 1.673 1.029 2.471
(1.008) (0.952) (0.174) (1.556)
Average value of irregularity (R$1000) 106.28 175.85 100.18 124.91
(263.9) (274.2) (209.2) (180.5)
Share of audited resources related to corruption 0.043 0.083 0.026 0.087
(0.073) (0.099) (0.044) (0.111)
Share of audited items related to corruption 0.046 0.046 0.029 0.068
(0.034) (0.028) (0.012) (0.048)

























Notes: This table reports descriptive statistics on the various measures of corruption. These statistics were only computed for the 492 municipalities. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses.  
  















First-term  Second-term Difference First-term  Second-term Difference First-term  Second-term Difference
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Diversion of funds 0.021 0.022 0.001 0.853 0.967 0.114 0.023 0.027 0.004
   [0.005]    [0.102]    [0.003]
Illegal procurement 0.034 0.051 0.017  0.853 1.089 0.236 0.024 0.03 0.007
   [0.007]    [0.099]    [0.003]
Over invoicing 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.072 0.07 -0.001 0.002 0.002 0
   [0.001]    [0.024]    [0.001]
Corruption 0.055 0.074 0.019  1.778 2.127 0.349 0.049 0.059 0.01
   [0.009]    [0.155]    [0.005]
Share of audited resources   In dence of irregularities ci Share of audited items
 
Notes: This table compares the various measures of corruption between first and second-term mayors. These statistics were only computed for the 492 municipalities. Column 1 reports the means for the 
279 municipalities with a first term mayor.  Column 2 reports the mean for the 213 municipalities with second-term mayors. Column 3 reports the difference in means and robust standard error of the 




















Male 0.95 0.96 -0.01
[0.020]
Schooling 6.10 6.07 0.03
[0.176]























Population 25828.74 24878.19 950.54
[3877.32]
% urban population  0.62 0.58 0.046
[0.021]**
% adults with secondary school  0.25 0.22 0.028
[0.010]***
New municipality 0.21 0.27 -0.055
[0.039]
GDP per capita (R$ 1000) 5309.95 6189.44 -879.490
[1226.10]
Gini coefficient 0.57 0.57 0.007
[0.005]
Intergovernmental transfers (R$ million) 12.50 11.90 0.56
[1.943]

























% legislators in mayor's party 0.27 0.36 -0.087
[0.014]***
Legislators per voter (×100) 0.14 0.15 -0.01
[0.01]
Effective number parties legislature 4.55 3.91 0.643
[0.145]***
Margin of victory in 2000 elections 0.15 0.23 -0.083
[0.018]***
Judiciary district 0.57 0.52 0.046
[0.046]
Media 0.79 0.77 0.018
[0.038]
Number of audited items 41.50 42.72 -1.221
[1.894]
Total Resources Audited (R$ million) 5.86 5.18 0.68
[0.75]
 
Notes: This table presents a comparison of the mean political, mayor, and socio-economic characteristics of the municipalities 
between first and second-term mayors. These statistics were only computed for the 476 municipalities that contained the full set of 
non-missing characteristics. Column 1 reports the means for the 270 municipalities with a first term mayor.  Column 2 reports the 
mean for the 206 municipalities with second-term mayors. Column 3 reports the difference in means and robust standard error of the 
difference are presented in brackets significantly different than zero at 99 (***), 95 (**), 90 (*) percent confidence.  Table 4: The Effects of Re-election Incentives on Corruption 
 
 
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Mayor in first-term -0.019 -0.020 -0.020 -0.024 -0.026 -0.027 -0.028 -0.042
[0.009]** [0.010]** [0.010] [0.011]** [0.011]** [0.011]** [0.010]** [0.012]**
R-squared 0.01 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.20  0.20
Mayor characteristics  No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipal characteristics No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes




Notes: This table reports the effects of re-election incentives on share of resources found to corrupt. Columns 1-6 present the results of an OLS regression of the dependent 
variables listed in that column on an indicator variable for whether the mayor is in his first term. Column 7 estimates the relationship using Abadie and Imbens (2004) matching 
estimator and Column 8 use a Tobit specification. Mayor characteristics include the age, gender, education and party affiliation of the mayor. Municipal characteristics: population 
expressed in logarithms, percentage of the population that has at least a secondary education, percentage of the population that lives in the urban sector, new municipality, log GDP 
per capita per in 2002, Gini coefficient.  Political and judicial institutions include: effective number of political parties in the legislature, the number of legislator per voter, the 
share of the legislature that is of the same party as the mayor, and whether the municipality is judiciary district, and the amount of resources sent to the municipal expressed in 
logarithms. Robust standard errors are displayed in brackets. Significantly different than zero at 99 (***), 95 (**), 90 (*) percent confidence. 
**
n No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lottery intercepts No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
State intercepts No No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Share of audited resources related to corruption
OLSTable 5: The Effects of Re-election Incentives on Alternative Measures of Corruption 
 

















Notes: This table reports the effects of re-election incentives on number of irregularities associated with corruption and the share of service items found to corrupt. Columns 1-2 
and columns 5-6 present the results of an OLS regression of the dependent variables listed in that column on an indicator variable for whether the mayor is in his first term. 
Columns 3 and 7 estimate the relationship using Abadie and Imbens (2004) matching estimator; Column 4 uses a Poisson specification and  Column 8 uses a Tobit specification. 
Mayor characteristics include the age, gender, education and party affiliation of the mayor. Municipal characteristics: population expressed in logarithms, percentage of the 
population that has at least a secondary education, percentage of the population that lives in the urban sector, new municipality, log GDP per capita per in 2002, Gini coefficient.  
Political and judicial institutions include: effective number of political parties in the legislature, the number of legislator per voter, the share of the legislature that is of the same 
party as the mayor, and whether the municipality is judiciary district, and the amount of resources sent to the municipal expressed in logarithms. Robust standard errors are 
displayed in brackets. Significantly different than zero at 99 (***), 95 (**), 90 (*) percent confidence. 
Matching Poisson Matching Tobit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Mayor in first-term -0.388 -0.467 -0.339 -0.500 -0.008 -0.010 -0.010 -0.009
[0.158]** [0.148]*** [0.146] [0.127]** [0.005] [0.004]** [0.005]* [0.005]*
R-squared 0.01 0.43 0.17 0.01 0.45 -0.44
Mayor characteristics  No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Municipal characteristics No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Political and judicial institutio
**
n No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Lottery intercepts No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
State intercepts No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Share of audited items related to corruption Numbers of irregularities related to corruption
OLS OLSTable 6: The Effect of Re-Election Incentives on Corruption Controlling for Ability 
Dependent variable: 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Mayor in first-term -0.029 -0.032 -0.037 -0.040 -0.034
[0.017]* [0.018]* [0.020]* [0.013]*** [0.0177]*
Observations 328 328 328 313 313
R-squared 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.27 0.29
Mayor characteristics  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipal characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Political and judicial institutions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes







RDD linear RDD quadratic RDD cubic
Share of audited resources related to corruption
 
 
Notes: This table reports the effects of re-election incentives on the share of resources found to corrupt. Columns 1 – 3  include only municipalities where the incumbent ran for re-
election. Column 4-5 includes second-term mayors and first-mayors that get re-elected in the subsequent election. Column 5 includes second-term mayors and first-term mayor 
predicted to be re-elected in the 2004 elections.  Mayor characteristics include the age, gender, education and party affiliation of the mayor.  Municipal characteristics: population 
expressed in logarithms, percentage of the population that has at least a secondary education, percentage of the population that lives in the urban sector, new municipality, log GDP 
per capita per in 2002, Gini coefficient.  Political and judicial institutions include: effective number of political parties in the legislature, the number of legislator per voter, the 
share of the legislature that is of the same party as the mayor, and whether the municipality is judiciary district, and the amount of resources sent to the municipal expressed in 









served as mayor or 
legislator in past
Second-term and first-term 
that served as mayor or 




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Mayor in first-term -0.031 -0.039 -0.029 -0.056
[0.012]** [0.014]*** [0.016]* [0.018]***
Mayor with political experience 0.005
[0.013]
Future candidate for higher level offices -0.049
[0.021]**
R-squared 0.21 0.31 0.29 0.33 0.33
Observations 467 280 304 240 200
Mayor and municipal characteristics  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Political and judiciary institutions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lottery intercepts Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State intercepts Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Share of audited resources related to corruption
 
 
Notes: This table reports the effects of re-election incentives on the share of resources found to corrupt. Column 1 uses the full sample. Column 2 includes only municipalities with 
a second-term mayor and first-term mayor who had been mayor in a previous term. Column 3 includes only municipalities with a second-term mayor and first-term mayors who 
had been either a mayor or legislator in a previous term. Column 4 includes second-term mayors and first-mayors that get re-elected in the subsequent election and served as either 
a mayor or legislator in the past. Column 5 includes only second-term mayors.  Mayor characteristics include the age, gender, education and party affiliation of the mayor.  
Municipal characteristics: population expressed in logarithms, percentage of the population that has at least a secondary education, percentage of the population that lives in the 
urban sector, new municipality, log GDP per capita per in 2002, Gini coefficient.  Political and judicial institutions include: effective number of political parties in the legislature, 
the number of legislator per voter, the share of the legislature that is of the same party as the mayor, and whether the municipality is judiciary district, and the amount of resources 
sent to the municipal expressed in logarithms. Robust standard errors are displayed in brackets. Significantly different than zero at 99 (***), 95 (**), 90 (*) percent confidence. Table 8: Local Characteristics and the Effect of Re-Election Incentives on Corruption 
 
Dependent variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mayor in first-term -0.049 -0.098 -0.066 -0.045
[0.017]*** [0.029]*** [0.025]*** [0.022]***
Judiciary district -0.029
[0.018]








First-term × Legislative support 0.120
[0.060]**
Political competition  -0.149
[0.097]
First-term × Political competition 0.071
[0.078]
F-test joint hypothesis 4.05 5.87 3.83 3.33
P - v a l u e 0 . 0 20 . 0 00 . 0 20 . 0 4
R - s q u a r e d 0 . 2 10 . 2 30 . 2 10 . 2 1
Share of audited resources related to corruption
 
Notes: This table reports the effects of re-election incentives on share of resources found to corrupt.  The sample includes all 476 municipalities. All regressions include mayor 
characteristics, municipal characteristics, political and judiciary characteristics, state and lottery intercepts.  Political competition is defined as 1 divided by the effective number of 
political parties. Mayor characteristics include the age, gender, education and party affiliation of the mayor. Municipal characteristics: population expressed in logarithms, 
percentage of the population that has at least a secondary education, percentage of the population that lives in the urban sector, new municipality, log GDP per capita per in 2002, 
Gini coefficient.  Political and judicial institutions include: effective number of political parties in the legislature, the number of legislator per voter, the share of the legislature that 
is of the same party as the mayor, and whether the municipality is judiciary district, and the amount of resources sent to the municipal expressed in logarithms. Robust standard 
errors are displayed in brackets. Significantly different than zero at 99 (***), 95 (**), 90 (*) percent confidence.  
Notes: This table reports the effects of re-election incentives on share of resources found to corrupt. Columns 1-4 present the results of an OLS regression of the dependent 
variables listed in that column on an indicator variable for whether the mayor is in his first term in addition to the other variables listed. The sample includes all 476 municipalities. 
All regressions include mayor characteristics, municipal characteristics, political and judiciary characteristics, state and lottery intercepts. Mayor characteristics include the age, 
gender, education and party affiliation of the mayor. Municipal characteristics: population expressed in logarithms, percentage of the population that has at least a secondary 
education, percentage of the population that lives in the urban sector, new municipality, log GDP per capita per in 2002, Gini coefficient.  Political and judicial institutions include: 
effective number of political parties in the legislature, the number of legislator per voter, the share of the legislature that is of the same party as the mayor, and whether the 
municipality is judiciary district, and the amount of resources sent to the municipal expressed in logarithms. Robust standard errors are displayed in brackets. Significantly 
different than zero at 99 (***), 95 (**), 90 (*) percent confidence. 
Dependent variable:
(1) (2) (3) (3) (4)
Mayor in first-term -0.025 -0.028 -0.03 0.05 0.084
[0.014]* [0.011]** [0.013]** [0.124] [0.169]
Audited in election year -0.006 0.082
[0.014] [0.136]
First-term × audited in election year 0.001 -0.087
[0.017] [0.172]
Mayor in PT  -0.045
[0.047]
First-term × mayor in PT  0.023
[0.050]
Mayor same party governor -0.01
[0.017]
First-term × same party governor 0.012
[0.020]
R-squared 0.18 0.21 0.21 0.59 0.59




Table 9: Testing for the Political Manipulation of Audit Reports 
 Appendix Table 1: The Effect of Re-Election Incentives on Corruption Controlling for Ability: Alternative Functional Forms 
(1) (3) (4) (5)
Mayor in first-term -0.020 -0.032 -0.043 -0.020
[0.011]* [0.017]* [0.023]* [0.027]








First-term × Win Margin -0.050 -0.184 0.135
[0.087] [0.219] [0.423]
First-term × Win Margin 
2 -0.362 2.196
[0.377] [1.590]
First-term × Win Margin 
3 2.084
[1.617]
Observations 328 328 328 328
R-squared 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.18
Mayor characteristics  Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipal characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Political and judicial institut Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lottery intercepts Yes Yes Yes Yes
Incumbents who run 








Notes: This table reports the effects of re-election incentives on share of resources found to corrupt.  The sample includes all 328 municipalities, where the incumbent ran for re-
election. Mayor characteristics include the age, gender, education and party affiliation of the mayor. Municipal characteristics: population expressed in logarithms, percentage of 
the population that has at least a secondary education, percentage of the population that lives in the urban sector, new municipality, log GDP per capita per in 2002, Gini 
coefficient.  Political and judicial institutions include: effective number of political parties in the legislature, the number of legislator per voter, the share of the legislature that is of 
the same party as the mayor, and whether the municipality is judiciary district, and the amount of resources sent to the municipal expressed in logarithms. Robust standard errors 
are displayed in brackets. Significantly different than zero at 99 (***), 95 (**), 90 (*) percent confidence.  